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THE EUROPEAN NEWS.

The New York papers of Monday contain the details of the foreign news brought to Boston on Saturday evening by the Liverpool steam-boat *Hibernia*. The dates are to the 4th instant, being nearly a month later than previous accounts. We make the following comment:

There is no political intelligence of interest. Ireland and Irish affairs continue to be the chief topics of interest, and France yet stalks unchecked through the land. France is experiencing a severe financial crisis, as well as suffering from scarcity.

Complaints are made in the papers that so much less grain is sent from the United States to France than to England ports. Large orders it is said have come out by the steamer. Very large shipments of grain for England and France have been made at Constantinople.

The Prussian Monarch had at last fulfilled a promise made a quarter of a century ago, and given his subjects a constitution.

"BERLIN, FEBRUARY 20.—Prussia has at length received confirmation in the shape of the long-promised constitution. The King has issued letters patent, enacting that the provisions of the kingdom shall be united into a general code, as often as it shall be necessary to raise loans or to increase existing taxes. Thus the King accedes to the diet some other power over the public money. The concession is not, perhaps, very great—certainly nothing like what was expected—but, considering that the first step towards liberty, its importance cannot be overrated."

The English corn market has fluctuated since the 1st of January, but the quotations at the sailing of the steamer were in advance of those of the 3d ultimo. Cotton had declined about 3d. per pound.

The state of the revenue of Great Britain was in the highest degree satisfactory. The excess of the income over the expenditure of the country, for the year ending the 5th of January last, was no less than £2,846,000. The surplus of the financial year ending the 5th of April will be considerably more, as the revenue of the current quarter for the first six weeks already exhibit an increase upon the corresponding period of last year of £500,000—consisting of customs £245,000, excise £106,000, and the balance of various miscellaneous items.

The income of the next year is estimated at £52,515,000, and the expenditure, including £122,000 for additional interest, is estimated at £23,178,077, leaving an expected surplus of £29,336,923.

"In making the above statement the Chancellor of the Exchequer omitted all sums granted for the relief of Ireland. Two millions of pounds sterling had already been advanced, and he did not think it should be safe in reckoning the expenditure at much less than £1,000,000 a month up to the time of the next harvest. The numbers requiring relief might still increase. He therefore could not calculate the sum required at less than £8,000,000, which, with the £2,000,000 already advanced, made the whole sum to be advanced, either as grant or loan, not less than £10,000,000. No taxation, no increase of the income or property tax, could provide the money within the year, and he therefore compelled to enter the market as a borrower."

The *London Times* of the 25th ultimo devotes an article to the Mexican war, of which the accounts, it says, are exceedingly confused. The ease with which towns are taken, provinces annexed, &c. is cited as astounding, and the *Times* says:

"A sixteen-gun ship impounds a province; a regiment of volunteers annexes a quarter of a continent; and towns are taken by fifty men and garrisons of five and twenty, in the midst of a numerous and experienced population. The armies of the West and of the Centre, of Conquest and of Occupation, are all represented by detachments which would hardly, if concentrated, make up one effective division."

The various schemes suggested for closing the war are then rehearsed and ridiculed. The article closes thus:

"The point most perplexing to ordinary European minds is the object for which this much-desired peace is sought. If the provinces and ports, the people and property, the taxes and customs of a nation can be seized and distributed at liberty, it is hard to conceive what further advantage can be gained by the most amicable negotiations. What does President Polk want to buy with two millions of dollars, when he can get so much for nothing? Philip of Macedonia's receipt for taking a town was sensible enough; but who ever drove an ass laden with silver into an unprotected town? The Mexicans have clearly the advantage of their foes. Defeat and invasion may easily be put up with when they leave the conquerors beggars and the vanquished choicest. Santa Anna is flattered with compliments and beset with solicitations, and has the daily refusal of half a dozen overtures of the eternal ally of his enemies. He can hardly do better than strengthen himself by additional arms and fresh recruits, and leave his adversaries to complete their humiliation and embarrassments by a protracted career of glory."

The *Times* of the 24th discusses the finances of England. Ten years ago the national debt was £788,398,570; at the close of 1846 it had been reduced to £782,918,984. The failure of a root has now required its increase by £8,000,000, and all the ground gained before has thus been lost. All Ireland is cast upon the bounty of the State. The prospect of a surplus in the Treasury, after meeting the expenses of the Government, is very slight. In conclusion, the *Times* says:

"The present year has been confidently looked forward to by many as the expected epoch of a similar fiscal emancipation. Public opinion had already flattered the boon. But it cannot be. With Ireland converted into one vast pauper colony, with pauper landlords, pauper farmers, pauper peasants, all depending on the Treasury, there can be no more thought of remission. The workingmen of England must bear their taxes. It stands to reason that they must. How else can they feed all Ireland, which they know they have to do?"

The Irish poor are emigrating in great numbers, chiefly to the United States. All the ready ports are crowded; but, the *Chronicle* says, "unfortunately they are those whose loss will be severely felt, as they possess pecuniary means and are not destitute." Freight for steerage passengers has risen to four guineas. Landlords are aiding their peasantry to emigrate:

"Mr. R. S. Guinness, of Dublin, has issued an address to his poorer tenants in the county of Wexford, offering £3 to each person in a family, provided the whole go together, and also £1 for each individual, the latter sum to be paid on arrival in New York, Quebec, or any other American port that may be fixed upon."

The Journal des Debats states that a good understanding has been restored between M. Guizot and the English Minister, Lord Normanby, the latter making the first advances and the Austrian Minister acting as mediator. Lord Normanby had been received with great cordiality by the King, Louis Philippe. Count Walewski has been appointed French Minister to the Plate Republic, and was to sail in a few days.

"The financial position of France is said to be most embarrassing. The Paris correspondent of a morning paper puts down the deficiency at nearly thirty-nine millions of pounds sterling, and adds that the Department of Finance is unable to answer the demands upon it. The Budget Committee, it is added, has been ordered to make appearances square as much as possible; but even their version will show a deficiency of 400,000,000 francs, or sixteen millions sterling."

"France, like Germany, is menaced with extensive emigrations to America. In Alsace the inhabitants of whole villages are preparing to leave their native land. The Budget Committee, it is added, has been ordered to make appearances square as much as possible; but even their version will show a deficiency of 400,000,000 francs, or sixteen millions sterling."

"The Government has received news from Tahiti up to the 12th November. Several engagements have taken place between the French and the natives, and the Governor, M. Brast, had no hope of deterring the latter until after the arrival of fresh troops from France."

Further outbreaks have occurred in Spain. The Carlists were making great progress in the north. In Catalonia they have already appeared in great force. The French Govern-

ment has sent a large military force to the frontiers. Projects had been introduced into the Chambers at Madrid for raising fifty thousand troops and borrowing two millions of reals. The loan produced a fall in the funds. Both projects were under debate.

"THE HAVRE, FEBRUARY 26.—A periodical published here, under the patronage of the Government, and especially devoted to Asiatic matters, praises in the highest terms the moderation and prudence of the American Commodore Biddle on his recent visit to Japan. Both he and his mission were treated so respectfully (the Japanese Government positively refused to receive him, the President's letter) that he might have been excused had he tried the efficacy of a cannon ball and gunpowder. But had he done so, it is said, that he would have retarded for years the opening of Japan to his country's commerce, whereas his moderation has given the Japanese the highest opinion of the nation he represented, and has favorably disposed them towards it. Similar praise is bestowed upon the French admiral. The article is written by a gentleman who has long resided in Japan as doctor to the Dutch factory. It appears that the King of Holland has strongly recommended the Emperor of Japan to throw open his country to Europeans, so as not to run the risk of being bombarded into civilization like the Chinese."

News from India and China has been received. The treaty with the Sikhs has been ratified. The Sikhs force is to be reduced by about seven thousand men; the frontier force has been strengthened, and affairs generally are peaceful and quiet. The cholera has visited Madras, but was on the decline.

The Pope is making new concessions to the Jews, and the Sultan in Turkey is doing the same towards the Christians. Prince Albert has been elected Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. He was strongly opposed, in favor of Earl Powis.

The case of Miss Burdett Coutts, or rather of Richard Dunn, indicted for forgery, in having filed an affidavit in the Court of Bankruptcy, alleging falsely that he had authority to draw upon her for money, has been tried and resulted in his conviction. He was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment.

A commercial convention has been concluded with the King and Chiefs of Cape Mount, on the west coast of Africa, for the suppression of the slave trade.

THE SCARCITY IN EUROPE.

The price of bread in Paris has again been raised 3d. on the 4th ult.

The King of Naples has forbidden the exportation of wheat, as he had previously that of maize.

The Prussian Government is making large purchases of rye from Russia, in order to reduce the price of corn.

Wheat of the first quality is now selling in Lisbon for 12 shillings sterling a bushel.

The Spanish papers state that large quantities of maize have been shipped from Vigo, and other Gallician ports, for England.

The Malta journals, brought by the Levant mail, express alarm at the small quantity of corn in the island, which must not exceed twenty days' supply.

Every small farmer in Limerick county, who can muster £20, or even £10, is about emigrating to America in the ensuing summer.

IRELAND.

The affairs of Ireland still continue to absorb attention. The proposition of Lord George Bentinck, for expending sixteen millions on railways in that country, was rejected by a large majority, and the accompanying discussion—for the House was two or three nights in full but discordant chorus on the subject—showed that the evils attending the proposed remedy would far outnumber the benefits.

Mr. O'Connell, it is said, is dying. The state of his health prevents his removal to Ireland. His confessor, Dr. Miley, left Dublin, by express, to attend him in London, where he now remains. His complaint is stated to be water on the chest and dropsy in the legs—fatal symptoms ever at his time of life.

"DUBLIN, FEBRUARY 27.—The government organs, and another paper here have observed within the past few days that the accounts in reference to the famine received from the country were more favorable than they had been for some time accustomed to receive, and the improvement was duly placed to the credit of government measures. Now, we regret we cannot verify these opinions, for they are nothing more than a few deaths by actual starvation in Dublin, Cork, Limerick, and the other large towns, but the returns sent up to the castle, and the statements received this day by the Central Relief Committee, represent the average mortality amongst the poor as frightfully increased since the beginning of the month.

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We extract the following reports of the condition of the poor from letters and papers in different parts of Ireland:

COUNTY OF COKE.—Dr. S. Sweetman, Dispensary Physician at Schull and Ballydehob, in a letter to the Cork Constitution, dated 22nd Schull, February 22, says: "This parish is at this moment a charnel house; its mortality is fearful, averaging daily from forty to fifty at least. I could not—west, north, south, or east—find a single house where there is not a fever, dysentery, or death. Our grave yards are crowded to excess." "To give you an idea of our state, for it is not all known—nor can words convey what a change a few months have made—I was informed by the national schoolmaster here that this time twelve months he had one hundred and forty sick children; the day he last saw one, Half, he said, was dead, and the remainder are unable to attend, for want of sufficient food and raiment."

COUNTY OF MARG.—The Rev. S. Stock, Rector of Kilcomanagh, in a letter to the Tyrone Herald, says: "I am persuaded I am within bounds when I say that 1,000 persons have already perished in Ennis alone."

COUNTY OF TIPPERARY.—Cahir, Feb. 25.—The physician of the Cahir Dispensary last week of fever caught attending his patients. The number of poor dying of dysentery and bad food is truly dreadful throughout the whole country, and had every human aid been extended.

COUNTY OF FERMANAGH.—Enniskillen, Feb. 25.—Every day the news from the rural districts is assuming a more appalling character. Fever and dysentery are in many places threatening the lives of the people, and we have heard of a number of persons asserting that the interments far exceed any thing of the kind witnessed in the county within the recollection of the oldest inhabitant.

Rev. Mr. Newell writes that in the parishes of Orammore and Ballinacorney fifty-four persons have perished from lack of food since December.

The Clare Journal says: "Numbers around us are dying of hunger. Yes, we say, the words again, the people are dying in every corner of the land from absolute want of food."

BELFAST, Feb. 25.—Owing to the large supply of Indian corn, the value of American has declined 10s. per ton, and large sales are making.

CARLOW, Feb. 27.—We feel great satisfaction in stating that all apprehensions as to a sufficient supply of Indian meal for this and the adjoining counties may be considered at an end, as an immense supply of this article of food has been imported by Messrs. Glen and Co., as well as by Messrs. Samuel Haughton and Son. In consequence of this momentary arrival, the price of Indian meal fell £2 per ton on Monday last.

NEWRY, Feb. 26.—The prices of most descriptions of grain, oat meal, &c. continue to have a downward tendency.

REE MEAL FROM RUSSIA.—The Dublin Mercantile Advertiser says: "Large orders, both on Government and merchant account, have been executed in the Russian ports of the Baltic, and now only wait the breaking up of the ice for the vessels to come to England. The quantities bought are what may be called immense."

DUBLIN, Feb. 28.—As the judges of assize advance on their circuits, especially in the south and west, they seem struck with awe at the terrible condition of the country. Mr. Sergeant Stock, who opened the commission for the county of Limerick, on Friday, in addressing the grand jury, said: "No doubt the times are fearful and alarming in the extreme. Every fact that transpires, and all the judges who have gone on the circuits, prove that in all the experience of past history the present famine and death have been of the most calamitous description that could fall upon a nation."

CORRESPONDENCE.

BETWEEN GEN. TAYLOR AND THE WAR DEPARTMENT.

On the 1st of February the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on the President for copies of "all the correspondence with General Taylor since the commencement of hostilities with Mexico," not heretofore published; also, the correspondence of the Quartermaster General's Department in relation to transportation for General Taylor's army, and the reports of Brigadier Generals Hamer and Quitman of the operations of their brigades in the attack on Monterey.

The President answered this call on the 27th of February, and the papers thus communicated are now in the course of publication in the Union.

We do not propose to publish the whole of these papers, (which, without being completed, already occupy some twenty columns of the Union,) but merely to note the order of them, preserving their essential parts, and give at large such as appear to be of value, either for the information they contain or for future reference.

The message from the President, accompanying the Documents, merely says that it has not been thought necessary to withhold any of this correspondence on the ground that its publication would be "detrimental to the public service," but he is satisfied that the operations to which it alludes "are now so far advanced, and that the enemy has already received so much information from other sources in relation to the intended movements of our army, as to render this precaution unnecessary."

The following is the essential portion of the note from the Secretary of War, covering the correspondence:

"The documents are numerous, and an attempt has been made to arrange them as to bring together letters relating to the same subjects; but it has been found impracticable to carry this out to the fullest extent. In regard to the correspondence with General Taylor, from one to two months usually intervened between the letters written by and to him, and the receipt of the answers; and within that period several other letters, upon different subjects, were sent and received. Had a strictly chronological order of the correspondence been observed in the arrangement, many different subjects would have been introduced between the letters and the replies to them. An attempt has been made to bring together the letters and the replies, and it has been done to a considerable extent in regard to those which have reference to the campaign and to military movements. Those which relate to transportation have also been brought together as far as practicable.

"Among the letters embraced in the call, several, merely formal, such, for instance, as enclosed returns, proceedings of courts-martial, &c., have not been copied; but the dates given, and their contents briefly stated in the accompanying synopsis."

The first letter is from the President to General Taylor, dated May 30, 1846, announcing to the General his brevet promotion to the Major Generalship, and complimenting him and his army on their gallant conduct in the victories of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma.

The first letter from General Taylor is dated May 20, 1846, at Matamoros, mentioning that he had called on the Governors of Louisiana and Texas for eight regiments, (5,000 men,) and requested General Gaines to assist in organizing this force; that General Gaines had called for many more volunteers than he (Gen. Taylor) deemed necessary, &c.; also asking for 1,000 tons, to be sent immediately to Brasos Santiago.

On the 21st of May General Taylor wrote again, soliciting further instructions. He says:

"Our future movements must depend, in a great degree, on the extent to which the Rio Grande is navigable for steamboats, and I fear that my expectations in this particular will not be realized. Though at times navigable as high as Camargo and Laredo, it is seldom so. My reasons for this are in the river and accompanied the expedition under General Smith, has not yet reached this place, though hourly expected. Could we establish and keep up by water a depot at Camargo, operations might be carried on in the valley of the San Juan toward Monterey, the first city of importance in that direction. A direct movement from this point to Monterey would require vast transportation, chiefly by pack mules, and would moreover be hazardous in summer on account of the scarcity of water, part of the route being supplied by wells only. The country between this and Monterey, by whatever route, cannot support an army.

"I shall lose no time in ascertaining the practicability of the river for steamboats, and shall occupy Reynosa and the other points as a base may be able to reach."

On the 8th of June the War Secretary wrote to Gen. Taylor at length. We make the following extracts:

"In my letter of the 28th ultimo you were left to your own discretion and judgment as to the measures to be pursued before the end of the unfavorable season shall be passed, and it is not now intended to control that discretion. You best know of the force which you will have under your command, and what can be best accomplished with that force."

"It is presumed you will hold both banks of the Rio Grande to a considerable distance from its mouth, and secure the uninterrupted use of that river for the transportation of supplies. I hope you will be able to take and hold in possession all places on either bank up to and high up as Laredo."

"It is proper that I should advise you that a considerable force, which will be also under your command, will soon assemble at San Antonio de Bexar. The ultimate destination of this force is Chihuahua, if it should be determined that such an expedition would have a favorable opportunity in the conduct of the war; but it might be at once used to take and secure the several places on the Rio Grande. Though we have no despatch from you since those giving an account of the battles on the 8th and 9th of May, we have such information as induces the belief that you are in possession of Matamoros, and that you are not now threatened with any considerable Mexican force. It is desirable that you should find yourself in sufficient strength to capture and hold Monterey with your present force. You are apprized that large reinforcements are preparing to join you. Besides the regular forces now under your command, and which will be speedily augmented, you will soon have nearly twenty thousand volunteers, (including the volunteers at San Antonio de Bexar,) who are to serve for one year. Your determination as to immediate movements will therefore be somewhat influenced by the consideration of the additional force which will soon join you."

"Much apprehension is felt as to what is called the unhealthy season. Agree that it is based on the coast, and it is the general opinion that it is healthy in the interior. Your positions should have a particular reference to this consideration. All the towns on the Rio Grande above Matamoros are represented to be healthy, and Monterey, in the interior, particularly so; it is therefore hoped that you may be enabled to place a considerable part of your troops in these towns until the fall campaign shall open."

"The President is desirous of receiving and hopes soon to be favored with your views and suggestions in relation to the fall campaign. His determination is to have the war prosecuted with vigor, and to embrace in the objects to be accomplished in that campaign, such as will dispose the enemy to desire the end of the war. Shall the campaign be conducted with the view of striking at the city of Mexico, or confined so far as regards the forces under your immediate command to the Northern provinces of Mexico? Your views on this point will doubtless have an important influence upon the determination of the Government here. Should our army penetrate far into the interior of Mexico, how are supplies to be obtained? Can they be, to any considerable extent, drawn from the enemy's country, or must they be obtained from the United States? If the latter, what are the facilities and difficulties of transportation? These are very important questions, and the answers to them will have an essential bearing in settling the plan and objects of the campaign; and it is desired that you should express your views fully in regard to them."

"Again: it is your view to know your opinion of the description of troops best adapted to operations in the interior of Mexico; what proportion should be infantry, artillery, and cavalry, &c. A peace must be concluded in the shortest space of time practicable. Your views of the manner of doing it are requested. It is not doubted that you will push your advantages to the utmost extent it can be done with the means at your command."

On the 12th of June General Scott wrote to General Taylor as follows:

"Recruits to fill up the ranks of the regular companies which are with you, or ordered to join you, to (say) about seventy men each, shall be sent forward as fast as practicable, so as to give you, we hope, in a short time, a total force of about 25,070 men."

"Without waiting for the arrival of that amount of force, but before, and as soon as you shall deem it safe in respect to the relative numbers and positions of the enemy, your knowledge of the country, your supplies and means of transportation, it is my wish and expectation of the President that, with your accustomed energy, you take up lines of march beyond the Rio Grande, and press your operations toward the heart of the enemy's country; that is, upon such important points as you may deem necessary to conquer and to hold."

The high road to the capital of Mexico will, of course, be one of those lines, and, if successful in your advances, the establishment of posts in your rear, well guarded, according to your distances from each other, and the dangers of capture, will be objects demanding your care. How far it may be necessary for you to penetrate, if not at least to the capital, and what holds you may find it proper to make short of that mark, will of course depend upon the events of the war. Should continued success attend your operations, you may some time before be met by the proposition to treat for peace, with an intermediate armistice. No such proposition will be entertained by you, without your being first satisfied that it is made in good faith, and without your being put in possession, or put by stipulation into possession, of such commanding positions as will ensure good faith on the part of the enemy. Being satisfied on this point, you may conclude an armistice for a limited time, and refer the proposition to treat for peace to the Government here. In such a case, it should be stipulated that, pending the armistice, the authorities of the enemy's country shall suspend their military operations, and that the United States shall agree to pass the proper regulations, leaving the payment or the settlement, on account of such supplies, to the definitive treaty of peace between the belligerents."

An expedition, sent out against the province of New Mexico, and probably North California, under Colonel Kearny, is considered, on account of the distance of his theatre of operations from yours, as independent of your general command; unless, indeed, events should bring him, unexpectedly, down the Rio Grande, or south within your sphere. In such case, we would refer your orders to him, directly or through Brigadier General Wool.

"Of the troops ordered upon San Antonio, it is intended by the President, as intimated in the copy of instructions (herewith) to Brigadier General Wool, that a large portion (here) under his immediate command, be directed by you, under the proper general instructions, against the city of Chihuahua, and other important points you may indicate, within the province of that name, in order to capture and to hold the same, subject to a definitive treaty of peace."

Next follow the instructions to General Wool, and a brief note from Gen. Scott to Gen. Taylor, directing certain things to be done by General Wool for peace to be made with the Mexicans.

The next three letters are of sufficient importance to be given entire, as follows:

General Taylor to the Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF OCCUPATION, MATAMOROS, JULY 2, 1846.

SIR: In reply to the communications of the Secretary of War, dated May 28th, and June 8th, and to that of the general-in-chief, dated June 12th, I have the honor to submit the following views in regard to the operations against Mexico, and the means to be pursued to secure them. My reasons for these views are in relation to the nature of the country, amount of supplies, &c., have not been as satisfactory as I could wish, the various accounts often differing even in important particulars. Either from the ignorance or interested motives of those who profess to give information, it is extremely difficult to obtain any reliable information. My reasons for retaining these six-months' volunteers in service have been set forth in another communication; and I desire, from motives of health and other considerations, to keep them employed as actively as possible. The twelve-months' volunteers can, in the meantime, form camps at various points in my rear; and, when the season for their service opens, they can be sent to the front. The above dispositions can be made in the rainy season perhaps better than at any other time, as the river is then in a good navigable state. For operating with a heavy force—say 6,000 men from this point—towards Monterey and Saltillo, through which passes the only reliable route to the interior, it is desirable to employ the river as a channel of supply, and the valley of the San Juan, on one of the heads of which Monterey is situated, as a line of operations. The direct land route from this point to Monterey is much longer than the line from Camargo; in wet weather impassable for artillery or heavy weapons, and in dry seasons, the route is so difficult that it is not practicable to employ the river as a channel of supply, and the valley of the San Juan, on one of the heads of which Monterey is situated, as a line of operations. The direct land route from this point to Monterey is much longer than the line from Camargo; in wet weather impassable for artillery or heavy weapons, and in dry seasons, the route is so difficult that it is not practicable to employ the river as a channel of supply, and the valley of the San Juan, on one of the heads of which Monterey is situated, as a line of operations. 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